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Interest is an emotion associated with curiosity, exploration, and knowledge-
seeking (Fredrickson, 1998; Izard, 1977; Silvia, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Tomkins, 1962). 
The first researchers to propose an appraisal structure of interest were Smith and 
Ellsworth (1985). An alternative appraisal structure of interest was proposed by Silvia 
(2005a, 2005b). Experiment 1 tested these competing models. Participants viewed copies 
of calming and disturbing classical and contemporary paintings, rated each picture for 
appraisals, and reported their experienced interest, pleasantness/enjoyment, and 
disturbingness. Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the appraisal structures for the emotion 
of interest and measured viewing time. Results showed (1) interest and pleasantness were 
unrelated; (2) novelty–complexity positively predicted interest; (3) disturbing pictures 
were highly interesting; (4) and viewing time positively predicted interest.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Interest is an emotion that is associated with curiosity and learning (Fredrickson, 
1998; Izard, 1977; Silvia, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Tomkins, 1962). The scant research 
conducted on the subject suggests conflicting ideas about what makes things interesting. 
There are competing models that describe the components of interest differently. Smith 
and Ellsworth (1985), the first emotion psychologists to propose an appraisal model of 
interest, suggest that interest primarily comes from an appraisal of pleasantness 
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). A competing model of interest from Silvia (2005a, 2005b) 
suggests that pleasantness is peripheral to interest. The present studies test these 
competing appraisal theories of interest. 
Appraisal Theories of Emotion 
An approach to emotion based on an appraisal theory perspective explains how 
emotions are elicited (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001). Researchers 
pursuing the topic of emotions from a cognitive perspective came, in part, from the 
influential work of Arnold (1960). She coined the term appraisal to describe a direct and 
intuitive evaluation of events that cause emotions. She proposed that we evaluate the 
environment from a perspective of our own well-being and check to see if the stimuli are 
beneficial or harmful, which then determines how we feel. Lazarus (1966), who was the 
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first appraisal theorist, suggested a further differentiation between a primary appraisal 
where we determine the implications for our well-being and a secondary appraisal where 
we appraise our ability to cope with a situation.  
During the 1980s a number of researchers worked separately at building different 
models of appraisal theories. Although subtle differences between the models are 
apparent, the result was the first proposal for the elements that differentiate distinct 
emotional experience. Appraisal theories were different from other contemporary theories 
of emotion because they attempted to offer a comprehensive view of the generation of 
emotions. Emotional reactions were differentiated from each other because of a 
distinctive appraisal structure, distinctive subjective feeling state, a defined physiological 
pattern in the body, and an urge to respond in a certain manner known as an action 
tendency (Ekman, 1984; Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Scherer, 1984; Smith 
& Lazarus, 1990; Tomkins, 1980). 
How Appraisals Work 
Appraisal theories of emotion explain two central problems of emotion 
psychology. First, what makes people emotional? Appraisal theories contend that 
emotions are elicited by evaluations of events. An appraisal is an evaluation that prompts 
an emotion.  Appraisals precede emotions; thus, emotions are not generated until after a 
particular appraisal is made. The elicitation of each distinctive emotion occurs from a 
distinctive pattern of appraisals. The different combinations of the same appraisals is 
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involved in producing all emotions. According to appraisal theory, all situations that 
evoke the same appraisal pattern will evoke the same emotion. 
Second, what makes emotions different? Appraisal theories maintain that a 
common pattern of appraisal is found in all situations that evoke the same emotion. 
Sadness, for example, arises when an event has been interpreted as motive-inconsistent 
(Roseman, 1984) or motive-incongruent (Smith & Lazarus, 1990).  It is further 
differentiated from other negative emotions by high certainty that the event will occur, 
and low power and control over the situation (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). When 
situations are perceived differently by different individuals, it follows that different 
emotions will be experienced. It is also given that the same individual who appraises the 
same situation in a different way at different times may feel different emotions (Roseman 
& Smith, 2001). Appraisals can be controlled or automatic processes—sometimes 
occurring without our awareness.  
Current appraisal theorists converge on the notion that emotions serve a 
functional purpose (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). They help mediate between the environment and behavior; emotions prepare and 
motivate people to cope with circumstances and environmental demands adaptively. 
Appraisals are accompanied by tendencies to respond in a certain way. In fact, Roseman 
and Smith (2001) maintain that emotions are more likely to have adaptive value in coping 
with situations more often than not. 
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How can emotions be summed up by asking a few questions related to appraisals? 
In keeping with the principle of parsimony, it is better to predict emotional experience 
using a limited amount of appraisal dimensions. Although proposing a larger set of 
appraisal dimensions explains a larger proportion of variance, a desired classification of 
emotions should remain simple (Scherer, 1997). This will become more apparent in 
presenting the two competing models of appraisals that predict the emotion of interest. 
Appraisal Models of Interest 
 Smith and Ellsworth (1985) proposed the first appraisal model of interest. They 
suggested that six cognitive appraisal dimensions (pleasantness, anticipated effort, 
certainty, attentional activity, responsibility, and control) differentiated emotional 
experience. They asked people to remember past emotional experiences, one at a time, 
and then they asked them to rate the experience on scales designed to tap their proposed 
dimensions. The 15 emotions that were measured included the basic emotions (e.g., 
happiness, interest, sadness, fear, anger, contempt, disgust, surprise, shame, and guilt) 
previously proposed by Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1982), Izard (1977), and 
Tomkins (1982). They also included emotions that would differentiate pleasant states 
such as challenge, pride, and hope. Each emotion was composed of different patterns of 
appraisals. Their results suggested that interest involved four appraisal components: high 
pleasantness, high effort, moderate certainty, and high attentional activity. Since interest 
 
5 
was grouped among the pleasant emotions, a core feature was the overlap with the 
emotion of enjoyment. 
  In a later study, Ellsworth and Smith (1988) found that pleasant emotions were 
less differentiated than unpleasant emotions. Participants were asked to recall pleasant 
experiences associated with particular situational appraisals. Evidence was found for a 
distinct pattern of appraisals between interest, hope/confidence, challenge, tranquility, 
playfulness, and love. Interest, for example, was suggested to be initiated as a response to 
situations perceived to be important and to require high levels of attention, as was found 
in the first study (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Although it was suggested that people could 
possibly experience interest in unpleasant circumstances, Ellsworth and Smith maintained 
that “pure interest is a pleasant emotion” (p. 328). 
Ellsworth and Smith (1988) concluded that the reason why pleasant emotional 
experiences are less differentiated than unpleasant experiences is because of high levels 
of intercorrelation between the pleasant emotions. In addition, when participants are 
asked about pleasant emotions in general, happiness is reported by almost all participants. 
This suggests that there might be a generic lack of differentiation to pleasant emotions. 
They proposed that the term “happy” becomes redundant and is used to characterize all 
pleasant experiences. 
This line of research helped to establish the appraisals associated with emotions 
such as interest. The research designs, however, relied on retrospective self-reports of 
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emotions. Participants were required to remember and provide responses to up to 15 
different emotions. Instead of tapping emotional experience, this methodology appears to 
target beliefs about emotions or people’s memories for emotions. Because interest is 
often confused in everyday speech with liking to do something, recalling interest 
retrospectively might easily be confounded with enjoyment. A clearer picture of emotions 
and specifically interest, thus, would come from in vivo measurement. 
An alternative appraisal structure of interest was proposed by Silvia (2005a, 
2005b).  In that model, the appraisal structure of interest has two appraisals: an appraisal 
of novelty-complexity (something new and complex), and an appraisal of coping 
potential (the ability to understand the new and complex thing). A series of four 
experiments tested this model of interest. The first study used randomly-generated-
polygons ranging from 4 to 160 sides (Silvia, 2005b). People were asked to pick the most 
interesting polygon. The appraisal of coping potential—the ability to understand—
significantly predicted the choice of the complex polygon.  As expected, people who 
rated themselves with the ability to understand complex art chose the more complex 
polygons as interesting. For people who were asked to pick the most enjoyable polygon, 
complexity did not predict what was most enjoyable.  
The second study used postmodern poetry. People read a poem, “The Whitest 
Parts of the Body” by Scott Macleod (Silvia, 2005b), that was complex and obscure. In 
the high ability condition, participants received information about the meaning of the 
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poem. In the control condition, participants were left to evaluate the contents of the poem 
without any help. As expected, those who understood the meaning of the poem found the 
poem more interesting. A causal effect of appraised coping-potential was supported for 
interest. The third experiment used experimental visual art (Silvia, 2005b). Half the 
pictures were simple and half were complex. People provided ratings of interest and 
understanding for each of the pictures.  For the simple pictures, the ability to understand 
was unrelated to interest. For the complex pictures, coping potential strongly predicted 
interest. A fourth experiment measured viewing time of random polygons as a behavioral 
expression of interest (Silvia, 2005b). Participants were instructed to view each polygon 
for as long as was desired based on how interesting it was. When people felt able to 
understand complex art, viewing time was the longest for complex images.  
 A follow up experiment was conducted using a within-person design (Silvia, 
2005a). People viewed over 30 pictures of abstract visual art. Each image was rated for 
appraisals of novelty-complexity and coping potential. Although the within-person 
relationships differed between people, each person’s appraisals strongly predicted 
interest. Once again, interest was a result of appraising something high in novelty-
complexity and coping potential. 
There are many benefits to studying interest in the five studies conducted by 
Silvia (2005a, 2005b). The emotion of interest was measured in vivo, a methodology 
largely ignored in appraisal research. Participants were not required to think of a time 
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when they felt a great deal of interest and then rate what they were thinking at the time. 
Only one emotion was measured, allowing for better control of the stimulus materials and 
allowing the participants to respond directly to the central construct of interest. Each 
study was conducted in a laboratory setting and used convergent methods to support the 
proposed appraisal structure of interest.  
The Present Research 
The two appraisal models make different predictions. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) 
posited that interest involved four appraisal components: high pleasantness, high effort, 
moderate certainty, and high attentional activity. Silvia (2005a, 2005b) suggested that 
interest is composed of appraisals of something as new and complex and also as 
understandable. The principal difference between the two models is the assertion that 
pleasantness is central to the appraisal of interest.  
Two experiments were designed to test these competing models. Can people find 
things that are aversive interesting? Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) model would say no, 
whereas Silvia’s (2005) model would say yes. The visual arts are an ideal platform to test 
these models. Visual art can be viewed as a system of symbols that convey meaning from 
the artist to the appreciator (Berlyne, 1971). Berlyne, the father of experimental 
aesthetics, suggests that art’s primary function is to express and induce emotions. 
Classical and contemporary paintings were chosen to reflect both soothing as well as 
disturbing subject matter. The soothing paintings were chosen to convey a pleasant 
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stimulus, whereas the disturbing paintings were chosen to convey an unpleasant stimulus. 
Participants were asked to view copies of paintings and answer questions designed to 
measure interest, enjoyment, disturbingness, and their appraisals.  
Both experiments test several predictions. First, they aim to replicate past research 
on the components that comprise the emotion of interest (Silvia, 2005a, 2005b). Second, 
they will demonstrate that the relationship of interest and enjoyment will be differentiated 
by complexity. Interest will have a positive relationship to complexity, whereas 
enjoyment will have a negative relationship to complexity (see Berlyne 1971, 1974; 
Evans & Day, 1971). Third, things that are disturbing will be interesting but not 
enjoyable. Fourth, I predict that viewing time will be positively related to interest, and 
viewing time will be negatively related to enjoyment. Finally, I predict that interest and 
enjoyment will only be modestly related. If the emotions of interest and enjoyment are 
differentiated, and things that are disturbing are found to be interesting, the model 
proposed by Smith and Ellsworth (1985) will not be appropriate for describing the 
emotion of interest. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1: METHOD 
 
 
Participants. A total of 83 students—68 women, 14 men, and 1 unspecified—
enrolled in General Psychology at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
participated and received credit toward a research option. Six participants were excluded 
from analysis for not following directions, leaving a sample of 77 students. 
Materials. Color copies of 13 classic and contemporary works of art were 
provided followed by measures of interest. Six of the pictures were calming (Departure 
of Ulysses from the Land of Feaci by Claude Lorraine, Dance Foyer at the Opera by 
Edgar Degas, The Water Lily Pond by Claude Monet, Poppies, near Argenteuil by 
Claude Monet, Boats at Low Tide by Georges Seurat, and Avenue de l’Opéra: Morning 
Sunshine by Camille Pissaro). Seven were disturbing (Head Surrounded by Sides of Beef 
by Francis Bacon, The Fighter by Egon Schiele, Muerte y funerales de Caín (Death and 
Funeral of Cain) by David Alfaro Siqueiros, Judith and Holofernes by Artemisia 
Genileschi, The Carrying of the Cross by Hieronymus Bosch, Saturn Devouring His 
Children by Francisco Goya y Lucientes, and Echo of a Scream by David Alfaro 
Siqueiros). 
Design and Procedure. Participants were run in groups of up to 8 at a time in a 
laboratory at individual desks approximately 5 feet apart that faced toward the front of 
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the classroom. Instructions were given by the experimenter to first answer a questionnaire 
related to personality. Following the questionnaire, participants were then asked to view 
pieces of art for as long as needed and then to answer questions for each corresponding 
painting. Color reproductions were provided of the classical and contemporary pieces of 
art, which were inserted into vellum sheets and attached in a booklet. The questionnaire 
that was designed to measure emotions and appraisals was 13 pages with each page 
numbered. Each page of the questionnaire then corresponded to a numbered painting. 
Measures of Appraisals and of Interest. Emotional responses and appraisals were 
measured following each of the paintings, using 7-point Likert scales. Some items 
measured interest (interesting-uninteresting and boring-engaging) and enjoyment 
(enjoyable-unenjoyable, cheerful-sad, and pleasing-displeasing). Other items measured 
appraisals of novelty-complexity (familiar-unfamiliar, simple-complex, and common-
unusual) and ability to understand (easy to understand-hard to understand, 
comprehensible-incomprehensible, and coherent-incoherent).  I also measured ratings of 
the paintings’ disturbingness (calming-disturbing). 
Analysis Strategy. Appraisals of interest were analyzed using within person 
measurement. A conventional between-person analysis would provide an average of the 
interest ratings, complexity ratings, ability to understand ratings, and disturbingness 
ratings. The averages would be used with least squares regressions to identify which 
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ratings predicted interest. The within-person analysis strategy does not use ratings 
averaged. Instead, an analysis is conducted using regressions within each person. So, in 
lieu of 13 appraisal scores averaged to predict interest, appraisals will be tested 77 times, 
one for each subject. There will be 13 ratings of interest, enjoyment, novelty-complexity, 
ability to understand, and disturbingness. The result is 77 regression analyses and the 
average outcome will then provide the appraisals that comprise the components of 
interest. 
 Multilevel analysis is appropriate for hierarchically structured data in which 
dependency occurs among observations (Nezlek, 2001). In general, an ordinary least 
square’s repeated analysis of variance can not be used without the same number of 
observations for all participants and can produce inaccurate estimates of error. This 
occurs because coefficients are treated as fixed and not random—producing misleading 
parameter estimates and tests of significance. The first level model, or random 
coefficients model, treats the first level regression coefficients as random variables at the 
second level. This means that the variables are treated as originating from a probability 
distribution (Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998). 
  There is consensus among many researchers that multilevel random coefficient 
modeling provides many advantages over ordinary least squares measures because of its 
ability to model random error at levels of analysis simultaneously due to its reliance on 
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maximum likelihood procedures to estimate coefficients. This ultimately provides better 
statistical information (Bryk & Raudenbush, 2002; Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998).  
Predictions. I aim to replicate past research on the components that comprise the 
emotion of interest. Second, I will demonstrate that the relationship of interest and 
enjoyment will be differentiated by complexity. Interest will have a positive relationship 
to complexity, whereas enjoyment will have a negative relationship to complexity. Third, 
things that are disturbing will be interesting but not enjoyable. Finally, I predict that 
interest and enjoyment will be modestly correlated. If the emotions of interest and 
enjoyment are differentiated, and things that are disturbing are found to be interesting, the 
model proposed by Smith and Ellsworth (1985) will not be appropriate for describing the 
emotion of interest. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 1: RESULTS 
 
 
For each picture, the 2 items measuring interest, the 3 items measuring 
enjoyment, the 2 items measuring novelty-complexity, and the 3 items measuring coping 
potential, were averaged to form respective scores.  Because there are 13 pieces of art 
that are nested within people, and there are 77 people in the sample, the data have a 
multilevel structure. I chose to analyze the nested data using multilevel random 
coefficient modeling, or MRCM, which permits for simultaneous estimation of within 
and between person effects at multiple levels as well as within-person analysis using one 
level (Luke, 2004; Nezlek, 2001). 
The multilevel analyses were conducted using the software HLM 6. HLM uses 
maximum likelihood estimation as opposed to ordinary least squares. The reported effects 
were estimated using robust standard errors. The within person variables (e.g., ratings of 
interest and enjoyment as well as appraisals of novelty, understanding and 
disturbingness) were all group level centered. Group centering helps prevent problems 
with high correlations between slopes and intercepts and is standard in this type of 
procedure. In addition, since analysis was conducted with the use of a Likert scale where 
0 is not a possible response, the variable would, therefore, need to be centered (Nezlek, 
2001). 
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The following four within-person regression equations were estimated:  
• Interest = B0 + B1 (Appraised ability to understand) + B2 (Appraised 
novelty-complexity) + R;  
• Enjoyment = B0 + B1 (Appraised ability to understand) + B2 (Appraised 
novelty-complexity) + R;  
• Disturbingness = B0 + B1 (Interest) + B2 (Enjoyment) + R;  
• Interest = B0 + B1 (Enjoyment) + R.  
The regression equations are similar to those using ordinary least squares with the 
exception that they refer to effects within a single case. Interest, for example in the first 
regression equation, was modeled as the individual’s average interest across 13 paintings 
(B0), slopes for the appraised ability to understand (B1), complexity (B2), and residual 
error (R). The multilevel modeling, thus, gives the impression of computing an individual 
regression equation for each of the 77 people in the sample (see Silvia, 2005a, 2005b). 
In the first equation, the analyses revealed statistically significant associations for 
both appraisal components. As was predicted, and further supporting prior research, 
increased appraised ability to understand was associated with increased interest (B = .205 
(from .089 and .321 with 95% confidence), t (76) = 3.5, p = .001). Increased appraised 
novelty-complexity, furthermore, was associated with increased interest in the paintings, 
B = .398 (from .29 to .506 with 95% confidence), t (76) = 7.32, p < .001). This can be 
interpreted at the within-person level that paintings were rated more interesting when 
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they were appraised as easy to understand and as new and complex. These coefficients 
support our appraisal predictions. 
In the second equation, the analyses showed that enjoyment was clearly 
differentiated from interest. The appraisal of novelty-complexity had a statistically 
significant negative association with enjoyment (B = -.563 (from -.645 to -.481 with 95% 
confidence), t (76) = -13.621, p < .001). The appraisal of coping potential had a 
statistically significant positive association with enjoyment (B = .17 (from .082 to .258 
with 95% confidence), t (76) = 3.874, p < .001). Whereas the novelty-complexity slope 
was positive for interest, the novelty-complexity slope was negative for enjoyment. Since 
complexity’s effect is negative for enjoyment, this supports the assertion that interest 
does not share the same appraisals as enjoyment. 
In the third equation, interest had a statistically significant association with 
disturbingness (B = .395 (from .327 to .463 with 95% confidence), t (76) = 11.485, p < 
.001). This means that as things became more disturbing, they became more interesting.  
Enjoyment, however, had a statistically significant negative association with 
disturbingness (B = -1.042 (from -1.08 to -1 with 95% confidence), t (76) = -51.571, p < 
.001). Hence, the more disturbing something is, the less enjoyable it is. Finally, it is 
worth noting that in the final equation that enjoyment had a non-significant association 
with interest (B = .034 (from -.048 to .116 with 95% confidence), t (76) = .824, p = .412).  
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 1: DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Experiment 1 directly tested two competing appraisal models for the emotion of 
interest. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) suggest that the experience of interest requires 
pleasantness and attentional activity. The appraisal model proposed by Silvia (2005a, 
2005b, 2006) suggests that interest requires appraising something as new and complex 
(an appraisal of novelty-complexity) and appraising something as understandable (an 
appraisal of coping potential). The purpose of this experiment was to test whether 
pleasantness is required for interest. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the 
experience of interest and pleasantness contain dissimilar appraisals. Appraisals of 
novelty-complexity, for example, had opposite effects for interest and pleasantness. 
Ratings of disturbingness, in a parallel fashion, had opposite effects for pleasantness and 
interest. Most importantly, because ratings of disturbingness strongly predicted interest, 
this provides a strong contradiction to the notion that pleasantness is consistent with or 
required for interest. This effect would neither be suggested nor explained by Smith and 
Ellsworth’s model. 
 Previous studies in experimental aesthetics have used viewing time as a 
convergent measure of interest (Berlyne, 1963; Bechtel, 1967). Bechtel developed a 
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device to measure museum visitors’ footsteps without their knowledge. There was a 
significant positive correlation between the time a subject spent in front of a piece of art 
and his or her rank order of preference. Berlyne (1971) suggested that looking time was 
largely a measure of exploration and found a significant relationship of scores of mean 
looking time and mean interestingness. Since interest is the emotion most commonly 
associated with curiosity and exploration, I expect that things that are interesting will also 
attract the longest attention. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test this notion—more 
specifically, that things that are rated with the highest ratings of interest will be looked at 
the longest.  
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT 2: METHOD 
 
 
 Experiment 2 was conducted to extend the findings of the first experiment. Many 
of the same paintings were selected along with some new pieces to allow for better 
control in the quality of the presentation. Digital copies of the paintings were presented 
electronically on a computer monitor. Once again, emotions and appraisals were 
measured following the presentation of each painting. In addition, viewing time was 
measured as a way of adding a behavioral component to complement the measurement of 
the emotion of interest. Participants were unaware that viewing time was being measured. 
Following the presentation of each picture, participants were instructed to move to a 
series of questions when ready that were aimed at measuring interest, enjoyment, 
understanding, complexity, and disturbingness.  
Participants. A total of 83 students—63 women, 20 men—enrolled in General 
Psychology at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro participated and received 
credit toward a research option. 
Materials. Graphical presentation of 20 classical and contemporary works of art 
was provided electronically on a computer using SuperLab Pro software. Ten of the 
paintings were calming (Adonis led by Cupids to Venus by Francesco Albani, Zwinger 
Waterway by Bernardo Bellotto, Capriccio: The Horses of San Marco in the Piazetta by 
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Canaletto, A Seaport at Sunrise by Claude Lorrain, Emarkation of St.Paula Romana at 
Ostia by Claude Lorrain, View of a Harbour by Caspar David Friedrich, The Giudecca 
Canal with the Zattere by Francesco Guardi, Landscape with Aeneas at Delos by Claude 
Lorrain, Seaport with the Embarkation of the Queen of Sheba by Claude Lorrain, and 
Dido building Carthage; or the Rise of the Carthaginian Empire by John Mallord 
William Turner). Ten were disturbing (Head VI by Francis Bacon, The Fighter by Egon 
Schiele, Echo of a Scream by David Alfaro Siqueiros, Saturn Devouring His Children by 
Francisco de Goya y Lucientes, Two Women Eating by Francisco de Goya y Lucientes, 
Self Portrait by Francis Bacon, Muerte y funerales de Caín (Death and Funeral of Cain) 
by David Alfaro Siqueiros, The Dead Mother by Edvard Munch, The Vision of the 
Prophet Ezekiel by Mikhail Vrubel, and Australian Scapegoat by Arthur Boyd). 
Design and Procedure. Participants took part individually in an empty laboratory 
with just a desk and a computer. Instructions were given that participants would view a 
series of paintings and answer questions giving their impressions. The 20 paintings were 
presented in a different random order for each person. Participants were allowed to view 
the paintings for as long as desired; unbeknownst to the participants, viewing time was 
measured. Following instructions, the experimenter prompted the first painting to appear 
on the screen. The participants were guided to press the space bar to initiate the questions 
after viewing the painting. Following the presentation of the painting, the following 
questions were asked on a 9-point Likert scale: How interesting is this picture?, How 
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enjoyable is this picture?, How easy to understand is this picture?, How complex is this 
picture?, and How disturbing is this picture?. Participants responded by pressing a 
numerical response on the keyboard. A 9-point scale was used because of its intuitive 
appeal with nine keys displayed on the top of the keyboard. At the conclusion of the 
presentation of paintings and questions, a message prompted the participants to contact 
the experimenter. Following a questionnaire, participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
excused.  
Analysis Strategy. As with Experiment 1, appraisals of emotion were analyzed 
using within person measurement. 20 ratings of interest, enjoyment, novelty-complexity, 
ability to understand, and disturbingness were used across all participants. The results 
allowed me to then examine the appraisals that comprise the components of interest. 
Predictions. I expect that findings will replicate those expected in Experiment 1. 
Interest and enjoyment should be demonstrated as distinct emotions. Whereas complexity 
will be positively related to interest, complexity will have a negative relationship to 
enjoyment. Finally, I expect to demonstrate that paintings that are disturbing will be rated 
as interesting. In addition to the predictions made in Experiment 1, I predict that the 
higher the ratings of interest, the longer the viewing time. Additionally, I believe that 
enjoyment will have no discernable relationship to viewing time. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT 2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
The following five within-person regression equations were estimated:  
• Interest = B0 + B1 (Appraised ability to understand) + B2 (Appraised 
novelty-complexity) + R;  
• Enjoyment = B0 + B1 (Appraised ability to understand) + B2 (Appraised 
novelty-complexity) + R;  
• Interest = B0 + B1 (Enjoyment) + R;  
• Disturbingness = B0 + B1 (Interest) + B2 (Enjoyment) + R;  
• Viewing time = B0 + B1 (Interest) + B2 (Enjoyment) + R.  
The regression equations are similar to those using ordinary least squares with the 
exception that they refer to effects within a single case. Interest, for example in the first 
regression equation, was modeled as the individual’s average interest across 20 paintings 
(B0), slopes for the appraised ability to understand (B1), complexity (B2), and residual 
error (R). The multilevel modeling, thus, computes an equation for each of the 83 people 
in the sample (see Silvia, 2005a, 2005b). 
In the first equation, the analyses found significant effects for both appraisal 
components. As was predicted, and further supporting Silvia’s prior research, increased 
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appraised ability to understand had a statistically significant positive association with 
interest (B = .096 (from .01 to .182 with 95% confidence), t (82) = 2.235, p = .028). 
Increased appraised novelty-complexity, furthermore, had a statistically significant 
positive association with interest in the paintings (B = .313 (from .2398 to .3862 with 
95% confidence), t (82) = 8.54, p < .001). This can be interpreted at the within-person 
level that paintings were rated more interesting when they were appraised as easy to 
understand and as new and complex. These coefficients support our appraisal predictions. 
In the second equation, the analyses showed that enjoyment was related to 
interest. Increased appraisals of novelty-complexity had a statistically significant positive 
association with enjoyment (B = .171 (from .097 to .245 with 95% confidence), t (82) = 
4.565, p < .001). Likewise, an increased appraisal of coping potential had a statistically 
significant positive association with enjoyment (B = .444 (from .356 to .532 with 95% 
confidence), t (82) = 10.05, p < .001).  
While these experiments are attempting to show the discriminative properties of 
interest and pleasingness or enjoyment, it is not uncommon for the two to be related. 
Berlyne (1971) suggested that, “some of the studies that have been reviewed suggest that 
pleasingness and interestingness vary inversely with each other, and some suggest that 
they vary directly with each other. But those that have investigated the relation between 
the two most thoroughly make it clear that pleasingness and interestingness are not the 
same thing and that the relations between the two are complicated” (pp. 213-214). The 
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results of the third equation, indeed, reflect this positive relationship between interest and 
enjoyment (B = .49 (from .404 to .576 with 95% confidence), t (82) = 11.423, p < .001). 
In the fourth equation, disturbingness had a statistically significant positive 
relationship with interest (B = .575 (from .455 to .695 with 95% confidence), t (82) = 9.5, 
p < .001). This means that as things became more disturbing, they became more 
interesting.  Enjoyment, however, had a statistically significant negative relationship with 
disturbingness (B = -.963 (from -1.033 to -.893 with 95% confidence), t (82) = -27.445, p 
< .001). Hence, the more disturbing something is, the less enjoyable it is. While in this 
circumstance interest and enjoyment shared a positive relationship with each other, 
analyzing disturbingness once again demonstrates the discriminant nature of things that 
are pleasant from those that are interesting. 
Finally, in the fifth equation, viewing time had a statistically significant 
association with interest (B = 791 (from 437 to 1145 with 95% confidence), t (82) = 
4.481, p < .001). Although nonsignificant, enjoyment had a negative relationship with 
viewing time (B = -58.650 (from -363.91 to 246.61 with 95% confidence), t (82) = -.384, 
p = .701). Pursuant to the idea that interest is associated with curiosity and exploration, 
when interest was at its highest, viewing time was at its longest. Viewing time then 
becomes the ideal behavioral measure of the exploratory behaviors associated with 
interest.
 
25 
CHAPTER VII 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Interest helps motivate us to learn and to explore, thus guaranteeing our 
engagement with the environment (Izard & Ackerman, 2000). Interest discriminates itself 
as an emotion because of a distinct pattern of appraisals that allow us to conceptualize, 
understand, and predict the emotional experience. Do things need to be pleasant to be 
engaging or interesting? The present research aims to address the discrepancies between 
two models of the emotion of interest from an appraisal theory perspective. Smith and 
Ellsworth (1985, 1988) proposed that interest is a combination of pleasantness, 
attentional activity, effort, and certainty. Silvia (2005a, 2005b, 2006) proposed an 
alternative explanation for interest—more specifically, interest occurs when things are 
novel and complex, yet understandable. Silvia’s model ignores the appraisal of 
pleasantness, suggesting that things found to be unpleasant can be interesting. These two 
experiments measured emotions and appraisals using contemporary and classical pieces 
of art.  
Two experiments provided evidence for the role of appraisals in the elicitation of 
interest. In Experiment 1, participants viewed color digital copies of contemporary and 
classical pieces of art. After viewing each piece of art, the participants provided ratings of 
interest, enjoyment, understanding, complexity, and disturbingness. Results showed that 
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appraised complexity and understanding strongly predicted interest in the paintings. 
Appraised complexity as expected, however, negatively predicted enjoyment. Finally, 
further differentiating subjective feelings of interest and enjoyment, ratings of 
disturbingness positively predicted interest, but negatively enjoyment. This supports the 
notion that aversive things can be interesting, but not necessarily enjoyable. In 
Experiment 2, we extended these findings showing that the behavioral expression of 
interest—time spent viewing an image—was highest when both appraisals were at their 
highest. When people appraised a painting as novel and complex, yet understandable—
the two appraisals central to the emotion of interest—the results clearly predicted interest 
in visual art. The behavioral measure of viewing time also supported a positive 
relationship with interest. Consistent with the view of interest as an emotion associated 
with curiosity and exploration, people who rated paintings as interesting spent 
significantly more time viewing paintings. 
Smith and Ellsworth (1985, 1988) did not conduct research on interest per se; 
instead their goal was to measure many emotions. They suggested that interest is 
characterized by appraisals of pleasantness, high attentional activity, and high effort. 
There are some similarities in the two models compared in these studies. Smith and 
Ellsworth’s attentional activity, defined as whether something deserves or demands 
attention, could arguably overlap with Silvia’s variable of novelty-complexity. Assessing 
something as complex, in addition, would require effort. The key difference between the 
 
27 
two models therefore would be pleasantness. If interest is truly an expression of curiosity 
and exploration, it would be inappropriate to suggest that interest would be uniquely 
based on pleasant things. Indeed, these two studies show that art pieces that are 
unpleasant—particularly pieces such as Francisco Goya’s painting of the shadowy Saturn 
devouring his children—are grotesque and macabre, yet interesting. This evidence 
strongly suggests that pleasantness is not necessarily central to interest.  
The methodological differences between the two camps of research compared 
here are significant. Smith and Ellsworth relied on retrospective reporting of past 
emotional experience. Instead of tapping emotional experience, this methodology appears 
to target beliefs about emotions or people’s memories for emotions. This can be 
problematic for an emotional experience which can be low in intensity and duration such 
as interest. In fact, LeDoux (1996) criticizes appraisal research as basing understanding 
of appraisal processes largely on self-reports. Ellsworth and Scherer (2003) conclude that 
“it is obvious that exclusive reliance on self-report measures leaves many questions 
unanswered, including the fundamental question of whether the reports reflect the actual 
experience or a later construction” (p. 587).  
Given the disparity in the appraisals, the methodologies, and the findings, a 
revision of the appraisal research is in order. The method used here and Silvia’s methods 
(2005a, 2005b) measured appraisals and emotions as the participants experienced the 
feelings associated with the art. This allows for the optimal manipulation and 
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measurement of emotion. Because interest is confounded by multiple meanings (see 
Silvia, 2006) and specifically can be interchangeable with something found as pleasant in 
everyday spoken language, asking open-ended questions about interest retrospectively 
might lead to results that suggest other experiences than interest. This method might also 
fail to capture the subtlety of an emotion such as interest, and relies heavily on people’s 
memory for prior emotional experience. Additionally, asking questions about so many 
emotions in one sitting can be at the very least a mentally taxing exercise to the 
participants.   
One current limitation of emotion research is that reliance on self-reports implies 
that we are consciously aware of our appraisals. While in some circumstances this might 
be true, there are many circumstances where we are unaware of our thoughts that lead to 
experiencing an emotion. Future research should attempt to address this shortcoming by 
developing ways of manipulating appraisals and emotions without our awareness.  
In these two experiments, the focus was on differentiating pleasantness from 
interest. A study with both methods might have provided strong convergent evidence for 
the appraisals associated with interest—demonstrating that regardless of an experimental 
or self-report approach, pleasantness is peripheral to interest. The results from the series 
of studies conducted by Smith and Ellsworth (1985, 1988), however, suggest conflicting 
reports of the appraisals associated with interest. They found consistent evidence for 
pleasantness and attentional activity. The other variables included certainty and effort, 
 
29 
but failed to systematically replicate across their studies, thus providing no evidence for 
inclusion in a model of interest. In light of the potential confound with self-reports of 
emotion and multiple uses of the word interest, in vivo measurement provides an 
unambiguous and preferable explanation for the intended emotional experience. 
 In Experiment 2, a behavioral measure of viewing time was used. This allows for 
the optimal measurement of the exploratory behaviors associated with interest. 
Participants unknowingly chose to view paintings for as long as they wanted before 
answering questions based on each piece. As expected, those paintings that were ranked 
as the most interesting also had the longest viewing time. This provides further evidence 
for the differentiation of interest and pleasantness. Our results showed that interest was 
positively related to viewing time, but enjoyment was negatively related to viewing time. 
Although the latter relationship was not significant, it was in the intended direction. The 
appraisal components suggested in the model by Smith and Ellsworth—specifically that 
pleasantness is the primary appraisal in interest—would be unable to explain this 
discrepancy. 
Finally, appraisal dimensions are the cognitive components of an emotion. In 
keeping with the principle of parsimony and Scherer’s (1997) suggestion of a simple 
classification of emotion, interest, therefore, can be distinguished from other emotions by 
asking if the situation is novel and complex and if there is the necessary coping potential 
(the ability to understand the situation) (Silvia 2005a, 2005b, 2006). 
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